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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-3839
___________
IN RE: GEORGE K. TRAMMELL, III,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware
(Related to D. Del. No. 1-17-cv-01448)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 21
March 1, 2018

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 1, 2018)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se petitioner George K. Trammell seeks a writ of mandamus. Because
Trammell has not demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief, we will deny his petition.
In October 2017, Trammell attempted to remove a Delaware state court
foreclosure case to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Trammell claimed that he had an interest in real property that was at issue in the case.
However, Trammell was not a party to the case, despite an unsuccessful attempt to
intervene in the matter. The state court does not appear to have received notice of
Trammell’s attempted removal, and the property was sold in November 2017 at a courtordered sheriff’s sale. In December 2017, the District Court remanded the case to the
state court because Trammell was not a “defendant” within the definition of 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a) who could remove the case. Trammell filed his mandamus petition in this Court
shortly thereafter. He also sought reconsideration in the District Court, which was
denied, and has separately appealed the District Court’s decisions.
A writ of mandamus is a “drastic remedy” that may only be granted in
“extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of
power.” In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).
Trammell’s petition indicates that he wishes to have District Court Judge Richard G.
Andrews recused from his District Court case and seeks to void the state court’s
judgment that ordered the sheriff’s sale. “Before a writ of mandamus may issue, a party
must establish that (1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2)
the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is
appropriate under the circumstances.” See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190
(2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Trammell’s first request appears to be moot, as he no longer has any pending
matters before Judge Andrews. We do not have authority to address Trammell’s second
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request. See In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 399 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Courts
have used mandamus to confine an inferior [federal] court to a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do
so.”) (internal quotation mark omitted); In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir.
2001) “[W]e cannot, as a general rule . . . use our power to . . . interfere with state court
litigation, thus exceeding our jurisdiction”); Demos v. U.S. Dist. Court For E. Dist. of
Wash., 925 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that federal courts “lack[]
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a state court”); Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cty.
Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A] federal court lacks the general
power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts . . . in the performance of their
duties where mandamus is the only relief sought.”); Haggard v. State of Tenn., 421 F.2d
1384, 1386 (6th Cir. 1970) (“[F]ederal courts have no authority to issue writs of
mandamus to direct state courts . . . in the performance of their duties.”); cf. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that the RookerFeldman doctrine deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over “cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before . . . district court proceedings commenced and inviting . . . review and rejection of
those judgments.”). Thus, there is no basis for granting Trammell’s petition.
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